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The main objective of this article is to determine if associative strategies followed in
Chile have had any impact on the enhancement of productive performance of
Chilean SMEs firms. In order to do that, the estimate of the impact is approached
using the benchmark given by Social Experiment but within the context of a `non-
experimental' evaluation design.  We conclude that these kinds of policies have
been effective in increasing the productivity of the participating firms, and have also
been efficient since they have achieved high social profits.
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In the course of the last decade the Government of Chile has designed and managed a group of
Programs of Managerial Development directed at increasing the productivity of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) segment of the economy. These programs were designed with the assumption
that the standard of life of the majority of the Chileans is, directly or indirectly, related to the
employment and the wages paid in this stratum.
While it is relatively well documented that Chilean industrial productivity is growing with relative
vigour (see Fuentes (1994) and Engel, et. al (1996)), the structural heterogeneity among the large and
small companies has not shown any evidence of decrease. Table 1 shows that Chilean firms with
more than 50 workers have a labour productivity double those with less than 50 workers.
[Table 1]
This gap also results in significant differences in the wages that the two types of companies pay.
Besides that, the employees of SMEs receive, in general, lower Public Health coverage and, according
to the international evidence, also have a 50% higher probability of losing their jobs than employees of
large company (Davis 1993). There are alternative  explanations for this situation, between them:
Economies of Scale
The typical argument is that in SMEs the unit costs of production are higher as a result of indivisibilities
in physical and human capital that, because of lower production levels, impede them from exploiting
economies of scale.
Smaller investment in physical and technological capital
Data from the last Chilean Annual Industry National Survey (ENIA) show that the investment rate for
the SMEs is only 50% that of the largest companies. Also, the first Survey of Technological Innovation
in the Manufacturing Industry indicates that while 89% of large Chilean plants have bought machinery
and equipment in the last 3 years, only a 62% of SMEs have done the same. Also, while 88% of the
machines bought by the large companies were new, this figure is only 65% in the case of the SMEs,
and finally, while 82% of this equipment had electronic controls, this percentage in the case of the
SMEs decreases to 45%. Obviously those numbers reflect a lower rate of diffusion of information
technology within this group of firms1.
Theoretically, it is possible to recognise two complementary forces as causing this poor
performance. On one hand, the credit restrictions placed on the SMEs are well documented2. A
second problem is the inability of management to select new technologies, as well as to adapt them
successfully. There are, unfortunately, too frequently cases where a small firm has gone deeply into
debt to buy machinery that it cannot put into operation. Indeed, the above mentioned survey of
                                                          
1 More details about the first Survey of Technological Innovation in the Chilean Manufacturing Industry can
be found in Benavente & Crespi (1995,1996) an the works cited there in.
2 Agosin, Crespi & Letelier (1996) clearly shows that there exist a negative relationship between firm’s
internal savings and size. Therefore, long term saving decistions in smaller firms are more vurnerable to short
term financial and economic shocks.4
technological innovation also showed that, while 67% of the large firms respond that the lack of
qualified people is an obstacle to innovation, the figure ascends to 75% for the SMEs.
Reduced organisational skills
Productivity growth also depends on the organisation of capital and labour in the plants. But to do that
specific skills are required to operate and to control the productive process and the administration of
the business. The frequent lack of those abilities in the managers becomes a strong factor impeding
better performance of the productive processes in these types of companies. Also, high search cost,
added to the lack of experience, also contributes to worsening the performance of management.
Weakened negotiation ability
The SMEs are, in many cases, suppliers of services, materials and parts to large companies. The
uneven distribution of the power among the parties has frequently led to renegotiations of contracts
where the large firm demands price reductions and thus captures the productivity earnings achieved
by the SMEs. This takes into account the fact that the real productivity gap probably is not as large as
the one measured by using nominal values, but the effect on the wages of workers is the same.
It is necessary to add to the previous elements that although Chile has an incipient National
System of Technological Extension, the problems of the SMEs to get in contact with it are also
significant. Indeed, while 68% of the largest Chilean industrial companies have had some
technological assistance from an institution providing technological services, the percentage in the
case of the SMEs falls to 16%.  While 30% of the large companies have had contacts with universities,
only 11% of the SMEs have done the same.
From all the above, it is easy to diagnose that, besides the failures of the markets, the complete
isolation from the public and private extension institutions worsens the situation of SMEs even more.
If structural heterogeneity, low wages and the high probability of failure are the problems resulting
from failures of the markets in which the SMEs operate, are the extension programs which have been
implemented an appropriate response? This document presents the most important findings of one of
the first evaluations carried out on one of the Programs of Development (known as  PROFOs).
The central hypothesis for the design of the PROFO program is that the main problem of the
SMEs is not their size but rather their complete isolation.  For this reason, the decision was made to
transfer resources to groups of firms, instead of individual companies (Montero 1995). The externalities
that are generated when making up the PROFO groups constitutes an opportunity for the companies
to improve their access to the internal and external markets, to transfer technology, to modernise
management and to contribute to local development.
Formally, a PROFO is an associative entity with a legal constitution that brings together small and
medium firms from the same industrial branches and regions for a limited period of 3 years at most. A
manager hired by the members is in charge of administration and public and private resources are
used to finance operation costs. Responsibility for coordination and evaluation falls on the National
Agency for Development (CORFO).
CORFO is responsible for regulating the general framework that sets forth the program and to
approve and assign the financial resources.  Intermediate operators are put in charge of field
operations. Some of those are public organisms such as the Service of Technical Cooperation
(SERCOTEC) others are private associations (for example the Association of Manufacturing Exporters5
-ASEXMA-, or the Textile Institute). CORFO works as a support agency, and it does not have any
direct participation in execution.
The administration of the program has been decentralised over time. In the beginning
SERCOTEC was the institution that ran the first PROFOs, due to their direct contact with the SMEs,.
However, starting in 1994, it was determined that the execution of the program could be transferred to
private operators properly authorised by CORFO. The objective of this decision was to accelerate
diffusion and to lower administration costs. An interesting innovation has been to consider union
associations as possible operating agents.
Those intermediary agents are key in coordinating participants in the formulation of common or
associative projects and in promoting access to other more specific State instruments.  For example,
many of the PROFO member firms apply to the Fund of Technical Assistance (FAT) in order to get
financing.  Another institution used is ProChile, in order to get resources for international fairs and trade
missions. A few of them also apply for grants for the support of technological development projects.
But additionally another objective that it is sought with this type of association is to enhance the
learning process of the firms. This can be achieved by firms specialising in their products, which have a
competitive advantages in order to get scale economies, and in addition can improve the negotiating
ability of the firms with their clients and suppliers.
The first PROFOs began in 1992 and from that date they have multiplied each year. At the time
of its first evaluation -1997- 29 of these groups had already completed a cycle with the participation of
250 companies. During that time, the program has acquired more relevance, the number of firms
involved and the amount of resources invested have increased rapidly. In this context, defined by a
high degree of institutional innovation, the necessity of evaluation instruments becomes critical.
The Chilean Ministry of Economics and CORFO are responsible for establishing the general
policy framework, and for the evaluation of programs carried out by other agencies.  In order to fulfil
that mission, these institutions asked the Department of Economics of the University of Chile to
implement a methodology that allows evaluation of the PROFO Program impact3.
In most countries, development agencies do not have units that can carry out the evaluation
process of the programs implemented.  It is, also, not recommended that an organism (public or
private) evaluate itself because of the distrust generated regarding the results. For that reason, these
institutions now look to independent entities like Universities, international institutions and private
consultants to fill that role. This paper summarises some of the findings of this evaluation study.
2 The Design of the Evaluation
The evaluation represents an advance, relative to standard practice, in three fundamental dimensions.
First, it set out to establish a clear relationship among actions taken by firms in general, actions taken
as a result of services received within the context of the program, and economic results.  Second, it
measured the net result of the program by controlling for general conditions corresponding to each
productive sector and company and, third, it incorporates cost-benefit results.
In order to fully consider the effects of the PROFO, the study focused on the analysis of PROFO
firms that had completed their three-year cycle. The starting point of the design was to revise a series
                                                          
3 Main results about this evaluation can be found in Universidad de Chile (1997); a summary of them in
Benavente (1999).6
of documents and secondary data given by the state agencies. This was done in order to determine
the type of action taken by the firms and services provided by training service providers.  However, the
most important methodological tool was the design and completion of a direct field survey that covered
the following topics:
Identification and Economic Characterisation of the Firm
In this section of the survey we proceeded to get information such as the name of the company,
address, year of starting activities, and ISIC code. One problem that we had to solve at his level was
related with the definition of the experimental unit. For this study, keeping in mind the necessity to
obtain information related to technological issues in the business, the most suitable experimental unit is
the plant not the company.  However, this can cause problems when evaluating the technological facts
of multi-plant companies. Since this survey was guided to SMEs, this last problem was not relevant
and when it was presented, technological information was collected for the plant level, while
administration information was obtained for the company level.
Competitive Performance
In this section of the survey information related to a firm's economic behaviour was requested for the
last four years (1992-1995) . The following variables were measured:
Main products






This information was collected with the objective of facilitating comparability with national statistics,
thus we followed the methodological approach of the Chilean Annual Industrial National Survey
(ENIA) and the Survey of Investment, carried out periodically by the Chilean National Institute of
Statistics (INE).
Management and Technological Innovation
In this section, information related to administration of the business and production organisation was
requested for the last four years.  In particular, we asked for the following:
Changes in global administration
Innovations of the productive process
Product Innovations
Administration of human resources
Most of these topics require questions which have only qualitative answers. As a consequence, the
design of the survey for this section included multiple choice questions. The format of the survey
followed the general recommendations of the Chilean Survey of Technological Innovation in the
Manufacturing Industry  (INE 1995).
The development of Innovative Skills7
In this section we requested information concerning the future plans of innovations that firms expect to
make in the near future in order to generate improvements in competitiveness. It also collected
information related with what means the innovations projects will put into practice.  We asked for plans
not only regarding global administration, but also for the production process, products, human
resources, and for the interaction with clients, competitors, suppliers and institutions.
In particular, we proceeded to ask about how much the firms would be willing to pay to obtain
technical assistance in areas such as design of new products, training of human resources,
participating in technological exhibitions, and other activities related to the absorption of modern
technology. Again, this part of the survey followed the general items of the Survey of Technological
Innovation in the Manufacturing Industry (INE 1995).
Revealed preferences for the Instrument
This topic was approached by means of incorporating specific questions that allow to measure the
preferences of the firms for the PROFO program as well as the main advantages and disadvantages
associated with it.
During a whole month a pre-test was done for the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the
questionnaire in obtaining the information required; and then during the three months period the field
work was carried out. The population of companies rose to 257, out of which 102 with complete
information were obtained.
3 Methodology : Natural Experiments with
Non Experimental Design
A major problem when developing an evaluation of a promotion program is how the real impact of it is
measured. In this section we explain the traditional and modern techniques oriented to isolate the net
effect of the program on the treated firms. We describe the most common sources of error while
measuring the impact and we suggest their main solutions. The application of this methodology for the
Chilean PROFO Program is presented in the next section.
3.1 The Traditional Solution to the Evaluation Problem4
All evaluation implies to make some comparison between companies `treated' and those  `not treated'.
This section considers the most common estimator used in the empirical literature to measure the
average impact of the treatment on a participant (the treated), this estimator is known as the Before-
After Estimator.
In this method the strategy consists of comparing the firm with itself. Because firms can be in two
states (treated or not treated) only in different moments, the method assumes that the results
                                                          
4 This subsection is based in Heckman, Lalonde & Smith (1998) and in the seminars given by Heckmand
and Todd in Santiago of Chile, October 1999.8
measured in any state are a good approach for the results for the same state at another moment in
time. To apply this method, data for the participants are only required at two moments: `before' being
part of the program and `after' it.
For example, if our interest is in measuring the impact of the program on the productivity growth
of a company.  If we can measure the productivity of company i after the PROFO Program, in the
moment t, and the productivity of the same company before participating, that is to say at the moment
t'; then the impact of the program on n participant companies can be measured as:
() ' 1 1 t t Y Y − = α (1)
where:
t Y1 : The average productivity of participant companies `after' of the program (moment t).
' 1t Y :The average productivity of participant companies `before' of the program (moment t ').
The main advantage of this method is that it only requires data on the participants in two moments of
the time: before and after the participation.   The main disadvantage is that it assumes that the
productivity of the participants in the state non-participation would be the same as they would have had
before participating. This implies that the productivity of the companies must have remained stagnant
for the case where they had decided not to be part of the program. Changes in the general state of the
economy or in the position of the company along its cycle of life (for example: learning processes) can
make this estimator totally invalid.
An important element that this method does not control is that companies may decide to
participate in the program after experiencing negative shocks in performance.  It is in these moments
when changes can be made in the plant, or certain improvements introduced without stopping the
production line. However, if these shocks are transitory and productivity shows mean reversion, the
productivity `without program' would grow anyway. In this situation we would attribute results to the
program that are the natural consequence of economic recovery. Only if the shock is permanent does
this procedure will give appropriate results for the impact of a program5.
3.2 The Suggested Solution from the Experimental Method.
The previous discussion should drive to the search of a method that allows determining that, indeed,
measured changes are the result of the program and not a mere consequence of the evolution of
environmental conditions.  For that, some type of control group will necessarily be required.
To illustrate the method let us consider that we want to evaluate the effect of a program on the
productivity of a firm. The standard procedure in this case consists of obtaining a sample of m=2n firms
that want to participate and to assign `at random' the treatment D (the participation in the programs) to
a half of the sample. The other half is excluded and forms a control group that can be used to build the
scenario `without program' that determines what would have happened to the participants in the
program if they had not participated.
This procedure implies gathering productivity information (or other variable of interest) before and
after the program for two groups of companies: the participants and the control group. In this context,
the experimental method suggests that an appropriate estimator of impact is the Differences in
                                                          
5 Examples of these applied to the labour markets can be found in Ashenfelter (1978).9
Differences estimator, which compares productivity growth for the participants with productivity growth
of companies in the control group. In other words, the differences in differences estimator is:
() () 0 ' 0 1 ' 1 1 t ot t t Y Y Y Y − − − = α (2)
where:
() 1 ' 1 1 t t Y Y − : It is the average productivity growth of participant firms (identified with a 1)
() 0 ' 0t ot Y Y − : It is the average productivity growth of control firms  (identified with a 0).
In a rigorous sense, this estimator can be reduced only by comparing the differences of productivity
levels between the two groups at the end.6 The random nature of the assignment of the companies to
each group assures that the productivity average of both groups before participating is the same, in
other words, this estimator can be written as:
ot t Y Y − = 1 α (3)
where:
t Y1 : It is the average productivity level of the participants `after' participating
t Y0 :It is the average productivity level of the controls `after' participating.
If the companies have been assigned at random to both groups, then we can be certain that any
transitory shock in the `before participating' state would affect both groups and we would have an
appropriate estimate of the impact of the program. The problem arises when the assignment is not
random, or when another type of restriction impedes giving a placebo to the control group.
3.3 Alternative Solution when the Design is Not Experimental
The problem with the estimating the impact of the program occurs when assignment of the companies
is not at random. This is the typical situation where managers of the programs define certain very
general conditions of eligibility, then assign services according to the interest of the participants, and
finally they obtain a comparison group from a parallel survey or database.  In this case we risk the
presence of a ` selection bias' problem.
Selection can be due to the individuals' own expectations of the program (self-selection) or by the
decisions of program manager. In this scenario, personal incentives and the incentives of program
managers can strongly affect the decision to participate.
In order to study productivity we could specify a model of the production function where the
added value of each company depends on certain inputs such as employment and capital. Let us
suppose that information on these variables is collected in the vector xi. We can model the added
value of each participating company by the following expression7:
1 1 1
i i i u x y + = β (4)
                                                          
6 In which case it then became a cross-section estimator.
7 A Cobb-Douglas function, for example.10
where u summarizes other non-observable characteristics of the company that influence production.
Likewise, for the members of the control group we have production as given by the following
expression:
0 0 0
i i i u x y + = β (5)
Following Heckman (1998), both models can be collapsed into a single expression where the
observed result depends on which group the company is in:
0 1 ) 1 ( i i i y D Dy y − + = (6)
where D=1 if the company is in the treatment group and D=0 if the company is in the control group. By
using the above expressions we have that the production `observed' for  each company is given by:
) ( ) (
0 1 0 0 1 0
i i i i i i u u D u Dx x y − + + − + = β β β (7)
If in addition we simplified the model by assuming that the coefficients of slopes of the two models are
the same8 with the exception of a constant which, is supposed attributed to the program, and that non-
observable factors are also the same for both groups. That is to say:
Then the previous model can be written:
i i i u D x y + + = α β (8)
where the estimated value for α  is the program impact on productivity.   When there is an experimental
design and assignment is made at random, the estimate of expression (8) for any conventional method
such as OLS will give appropriate estimators of the impact. These results will be equivalent to that of
expression (3) above9.
To study how a non-experimental design affects the results we proceed by assuming that in
some period t after the participation in the program, we decide to evaluate its impact on the productivity
of the participant, but we only have information about them after completing their participation. In order
to do that, we compare their production with a sample of non-participants selected from a secondary
database, for the same period of time. The average production of the participants after the program, it
is given by:
k t D u E x D x y E i it it it > = + + = = ) 1 | ( ] 1 , | [
1 1 1 α β  (9)
Where xi are variables that represent the `observed' characteristics of a company that influence its
production: typically employment and capital. K represents the moment of participation. The
expectation of ui, conditioned for the decision of participating, shows the correlation among non-
                                                          
8 Meaning that the impact of the capital or another input over the productivity is the same independently of
the participation in the program.
9 However, randomness fails when it influences the self selection process of firms, when drop-outs exists or
when substitutes  services can be obtained by the control group (contamination bias).
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= = β β11
observable variables that impact production and the decision to participate in the program10. Finally, α
is the average impact of the program. Likewise, revenues for the group of non-participants are given
by:
k t D u E x D x y E i it it it > = + = = ) 0 | ( ] 0 , | [
0 0 0 β (10)
The idea is to use the results of this group of non-participants to determine the contra-factual scenario
of what would have happened to the participants in the case of them not having participated.  The
average impact of the program, therefore, will be given by:
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( ) ( ] 0 , | [ ] 1 , | [
0 1 0 0 1 1 = − = + + − = = − = D u E D u E x x D x y E D x y E i i it it it it it it α β (11)
The estimate of impact of the program α  will be strongly biased, due not only to differences between
observable characteristics, but also to non-observable variables for firms of both groups. However, if
the selection of the control group were done in ways that assure that they have observable
characteristics similar to those of the participants, a large decrease in the bias would result. However,
the non-observable bias will still remain.  In other words, the impact estimator would remain biased as
we can see in the following expression:
() () 0 | 1 | ] 0 , | [ ] 1 , | [
0 0 1 1 = − = + = = − = D u E D u E D x y E D x y E i i it it it it α (12)
When there is a non-experimental design where no group of eligible firm is randomly restricted from
participating, how can the impact estimators be obtained? Suppose now that we have pre-treatment
information that is collected at the moment of enrolment in the program (t' previous to k). The
production results before participating for the future participants it will be given by:







While the result for the non participants is the following:







A consistent estimator of average impact of the program is the `Differences in Differences' estimator.
Firstly, we calculate the difference between the results after the program (t) and before the program (t')
for the participants. This removes the correlation among the non-observable variables and the decision
to participate for this group:










it it it it it it it it it x x D x y E D x y E D x x y E (15)
Secondly, we proceed in the same way for the comparison group:
                                                          
10 Note that ui has no temporal index. This due to the assumption that non observable factors remain
constant ( or fixed ) through time.12










it it it it it it it it it x x D x y E D x y E D x x y E − = = − = = = ∆ (16)
Finally we compute the difference between the expressions (15) and (16), and thus obtain:










it it it it it it it it it it x x x x D x x y E D x x y E  (17)
If both groups can be selected so that the evolution of their observable variables it is the same over the
time, then (17) can be written as:





1 1 D x x y E D x x y E it it it it it it (18)
In this way we will be able to estimate the impact of the program appropriately. The method of
differences in differences, however, has some disadvantages. First, although it does not assume that
there is a control sample randomised as an experiment, it still assumes the existence of information for
a comparison group in at least two moments: before the program and after it. Also, it is assumed that
the correlation between non-observable variables and the decision to participate are constant over
time (a fixed effect). Finally, in third place it assumes that impact of the program is a fixed constant α
for all participants11.
3.4 Matching Methods12
The previous results were built on the assumption that, controlling for the observable characteristics of
the exogenous variables, the firms were identical at the moment of deciding to participate in the
program. This leads to compare firms that are inside the same `support' of observable characteristics.
However, this procedure ignores the fact that the distribution of probability of each group inside the
support can be different. This implies that we must re-weight the companies in the control group.
Similar to the  differences-in-differences estimator, what matching does is to compare the
changes in results (for example, productivity) for the participants to results for members of the control
group, where the change is measured in relation to some benchmark pre-program situation. As was
mentioned before, this estimator has the advantage of removing any non-observable time-invariant
differences among the individual firms of both groups. But it also allows re-weighting the distribution of
probability for the control group.
This estimator requires cross section data on participants and non-participants at two moments in
time. Let us define t and t' as two periods of time; one after the start date of the program and other
before, respectively. 
0
t Y  is the result observed at moment t in the non-participation state and 
0
' t Y  is
the result observed at the moment t in the participation state. A necessary condition to justify
application of the method is:





0 = − = = − D X P Y Y E D X P Y Y E t t t t (19)
                                                          
11 Then heterogeneity can not be fully captured.
12 This subsection is based in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith & Todd (1998).13
What that means is that conditioned for the probability of participating, the average growth of the
control group is equivalent to what participant group would have had, the if the firm had not
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Where ni is the number of observations for the treatment group (in this case the same one for every
period) and nj is the number of observations of the control group. The key to the method is in the
construction of the estimator  ] 0 ), ( | [ ˆ 0
'
0 = − i i it it D x P y y E . In this case, the non-parametric
regression approach was applied (kernel regression matching estimator). This estimator chooses the
weighting in a such way that closer observations in terms of distance  ) ( ) ( j i x P x P −  receive more
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Where s is the expression within parenthesis in the numerator of (22) and h is the bandwidth13. In this
case we use a fixed bandwidth h. Since P(X)'s  are in the interval (0, 1) an appropriate h should be in
the interval 0.2 at 0.414.  Next, the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the choice of bandwidth
should be examined.
                                                          
13  Intuitively, a bandwidth refers to the interval length chosen to determine the number of the nearest
neighbours around a centre in xi.
14 See Heckman et al (1998) for a discussion about this point.14
4 Results of the Application for the PROFO
Program
The data for the estimate of the impact of the program were obtained by means of a survey applied to
a random sample of 102 participating firms  that responded to our request for information about their
performance before and after having concluded the period of participation. Once this sample was
obtained, the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE) was asked to give a sample of control firms
selected at random from a population in the same productive sectors and having similar sizes to the
participant firms.
However, for these control companies there is no information about the types of innovations and
changes of skills made by the companies during the three years of the Program. To have an idea of
the contra-factual scenario for the observed qualitative changes, we asked the participant companies
to indicate if they had made a certain type of innovation and in the case an affirmative response, if that
innovation had been a consequence of the program.
4.1 Impact Results at a Qualitative Level15
In table 2 the results are presented according to the frequency of positive answers. The second
column presents the percentage that, out of total of answers, the managers have suggested that the
change was a consequence of the program. Finally, in the third column we measured an indicator
called  `Rate of Impact', that captures the ratio between the first two columns. This measurement tries
to identify what types of innovations are more sensitive to the presence of the program.
Regarding management of the firms, interviewees have manifested that the most significant
advances were concentrated in the organisation of the production process, the implementation of
marketing strategies and in identifying the most profitable products. In all of these areas the
significance attributed to PROFO has been relevant.
[ Table 2 ]
Regarding to innovation of the production process, the most significant results were concentrated in
the introduction of quality control and production planning.  In relation to the management of the
human resources, the benefits have been concentrated in the training of managers and personnel in
that order.
Another area where PROFO appears to have generated significant difference is in higher
capacity of the companies to access the National Industrial Extension System. Indeed, the participating
companies had higher frequency  of affirmative response to questions such as \Did you improve
access to support instruments?", \Did you practice technical co-operation with competitors?", \Have
you tried co-operation with private consultants?" and \Has there been improvement in access to public
financing?".
                                                          
15 A detailed description about the impact of the program can be found in Universidad de Chile (1997).15
In summary, areas that were most sensitive to the program were marketing strategies, the
introduction of data collection systems, training at any level, improvements of the commercial
relationships with suppliers and clients, and the relationships with public institutions and private
consultants.
4.2 Quantitative Differences among Firms of Both Groups
The first step in addressing the evaluation of the quantitative impact of the program is to examine the
differences in firm characteristics for the two groups.
Table 3 shows the differences in the sectoral distribution of the firms.  Given the form by which
the control group was selected, a high degree of similarity is observed in this distribution. In fact, a test
of equality of distributions was not rejected16.
The situation is different when we analyse the scale results.  Indeed, because the INE tends to
collect information for larger firms, the control group it generated had companies that were, on
average, statistically larger than the participant companies (tables 4 and 5).
[ Table 3 ]
[ Table 4 ]
[ Table 5 ]
As can be seen in Tables 4 and 5, the control companies were larger than the treatment group in the
period before the program. The difference was clearly larger for added value than for employment,
which means that the control companies had a higher labour productivity than the participants `before'
participating.
A problem with the previous analysis is that it is based on individual variables, it would be useful
to have a multivariate estimator of the differences between the two groups for the base period  (t'). In
order to do that, we considered the conditional probability of participation for each firm before program.
We have done that by estimating a Probit model conditioned for variables given by productive sector,
added value, employment and simple interactions among these variables17. The average results of this
probability by group are shown in table 6.
[ Table 6 ]
In general, the companies of the control group have `on the average' a probability of participating of
27%, this being a much lower value than the participating companies, which show a probability of 59%.
Another form of investigating the differences between the two groups of companies before participating
is by means of watching the empirical distribution of the probability of participating. The results are
shown in Graph 1.
                                                          
16 Chi-Square of 4.2176 with a probability of 0.963.
17 The Probit model has a (pseudo) R2 of 0.2967 and with a Chi-Square of 100.60 with probability 0.000.
That is, both model are well different under a multivariate set up.16
In sum, the control group companies have a very low probability of becoming Profo participants.
In fact, there are relatively few firms of the control group with high probability of participating. This
graph illustrates the problem referred to in the methodological discussion: the existence of large
differences in the distribution of firms of the two groups. This implies the necessity of re-weighting the
observations in the control group18.
[ Graph 1 ]
4.3Estimates of Impact
The first two results of impact shown correspond to an estimate of the program effect on the growth of
the TFP using the traditional approach of the `Before-After' estimator, and the alternative estimator
`Differences in Differences'. To accomplish this, a Cobb-Douglas production function was assumed. In
the first estimator we considered the production function specified in first differences only for the group
of participating firms;  the productivity results are captured in the constant of the model. In the second
estimator we incorporate the control group into the database and we re-estimate the model.  In this
case the coefficient of the dummy variable is the impact estimator. Because we are estimating in first
differences, we are implicitly controlling for heterogeneity within groups.
As indicated in Table 7, the  Before - After estimator shows a growth in the TFP, after three years
of participation in the program, of 22,9%. However, this result could be an overestimation of the real
impact because it does not take into account that without the Profo program the TFP of these
companies would have grown in natural way due, for example, to learning phenomenon and
technological change. When controlling for these effects, the result was that growth in the TFP during
participation was 11,7%. That is to say, the traditional estimator appears to overestimate the results by
almost 100%.
[ Table 7 ]
However, the previous results are conditioned by the presence of a control group and a sample of
participants that does not necessarily have an identical distribution of attributes. In some way, this
could affect the results. In order to correct for this problem, we also estimate the impact model by using
observations whose propensity scores overlap. We call this estimator  `the Differences in Differences
with Common Support' estimator.
As we can observe in Table 8, the estimate using observations that are in this overlapping region
of the propensity score improves the impact of the program slightly; it now increases to 14,4%.  In the
Graph 2, we see that if we truncate the propensity score distributions so that they are in the same
support, the two are much more similar: However important deviations persist in the weightings of both
distributions.
[ Graph 2 ]
                                                          
18 Moreover, a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test of equal distributions was strongly rejected with a value of 0.4513
and a probability of 0.000.17
[ Table 8 ]
In Table 9, the results of the matching estimator are shown for three different values of h. The standard
deviation of the estimators has been calculated based on the bootstrapping method with 100
replications of the sample. The results of the matching estimator show a growth of the productivity in
the range of 14,9% to 12,4%. These results are statistically significant.
[ Table 9 ]
A comparative analysis of the three estimators suggests that the estimator before-after omits the
control group and strongly overestimates the impact of the instrument. However, the simple
differences-in-differences estimator is the strictest and gives the smallest impact. When conditioned for
the same support, the impact of the instruments rises to values of around 14%. The matching
estimator, that re-weights the observations of the two groups gives results in the range of 12.4% to
14.9%.
In synthesis, whatever estimator incorporates a control group gives statistically significant
evidence that the program has had a positive impact on the firms. If we use the Differences in
Differences estimator conditioned for the same support, the growth of productivity would have been
14.4% after three years of participation in the program. This result suggests that the program has been
effective. But the pertinent question is:  Has it been efficient?
5 Cost- Benefit Analysis
The cost-benefit analysis determines what has been the gain generated by the program when it is
applied to a certain level of effort ϕ  , compared to the situation where there is no program and it no
longer applies, that is  ϕ  =0.  Then define the benefit of the program as:
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where N1 (ϕ  ) is the number of participants in the program when it is implemented at the level of effort
ϕ . N0(ϕ ) is the number of non-participants when the program is implemented at level of effort ϕ . E
(Y1|D=1, ϕ ) it is the  average result of the participants when the program is implemented at level of
effort ϕ . E (Y0|D=0, ϕ ) is the average result for the non-participants when the program is implemented
at level of effort  ϕ  and, finally, c(ϕ ) it is the cost of the program associated with an established level of
effort.
Then when ϕ  =0 , as is in the state non-participation, N1(0)=0 y N0(0)=N, that is the population.
Likewise, if B(ϕ )=0, then the total product is increased when the  program is set at level ϕ  .  For the
special case where the result in the benchmark state “0” is the same whether or not the program
exists, in other words when:18
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There are no general equilibrium effects and the state “without program” of the non-participants is
similar to the non-participation state `with program'. This assumption  allows us to generalise from the
general equilibrium to the partial equilibrium. Keeping in mind that N=N1(ϕ )+N0(ϕ ), if  condition (25) is
true, we obtain:
() {} ) ( , 1 | ) ( ) ( 0 1 1 ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ c D Y Y E N B − = − ⋅ = (26)
If it is assumed that a redistribution of benefits without costs is possible,  maximisation on (ϕ ) in the
previous expression allows us to obtain the program effort level that maximises social welfare.  For this
important case, which is applied to social programs on a small scale with partial participation, the
measurement of the program impact can be easily calculated. We only have to multiply the average
impact obtained in the previous section by the number of participants and subtract the costs of the
program.
For the PROFO participants interviewed we calculate the operation costs of the program. These
were computed taking into account not only the CORFO contribution but also that of the participating
companies.  These are only direct costs, because they do not include the operation costs of the
institutions involved such as Asexma, Sercotec and CORFO. Nor were the costs of other activities
considered, such as those that were carried out during the program with extra funds such as
`commercial missions', `training', etc. For these programs the values here presented correspond to a
minimum estimate.
The benefits of the program generated an increase in value added of 14% above expected in the
event of non-existence of the program.  According to the previous results the average value added of
the companies would have grown in US$ 39,200 due to the program. The total increase was US$
4,037,600. These results give an estimation of an Internal Return Rate for the program of 21%. That in
any event is larger than the economy social discount rate. The Present Value of the Program
discounting the social discount rate is US$ 391,711.
[ Table 10 ]
7 Conclusions
The evaluation of the Development Programs (PROFO), shows that the instrument can have a
favourable impact on participating companies. As a result of the assistance received, companies have
carried out modifications of importance in some of the productive and managerial practices, and these
have been reflected in productivity improvements.
The results indicate that the main achievements have been concentrated mostly in three areas:
Improvements in the organisation and administration of firms  (introduction of elements of planning,
better specification of lists and functions, focus on the achievement of scale economies, and the
incorporation of modern marketing strategies).
Improvements in the accumulation of human capital (greater access to managerial training and
production employee training).19
Improvements in the access to the Chilean National Extension System (fundamentally technological
institutes, consultants, and supporting funds like the Technological Fund -Fontec - and the Fund for
Technical Attendance -FAT -).
However, program results are smaller related to significant improvements in the innovation of products
and processes.
The program has not only been effective, but has also been efficient in increasing the productivity
of firms; the costs and resources invested in the operation of the program have been more than
recovered.
In terms of methodology, it appears as a fundamental issue that the evaluation of program impact
requires follow-up on the participating companies, as a way of building panel estimators such as the
`differences in differences' estimator.  However, a database of control companies is also necessary. To
do this, it turns out being necessary to integrate the databases of various public institutions in order to
provide a `non-experimental' control group.
Another alternative for the control groups is to design the instrument with the impact evaluation in
mind. This could be integrated into the program in sequential form by, for example, overlapping the
participants over time, providing the appropriate controls. Or to start the program in different
geographical regions, and to match the companies of different regions by their similarities.
Finally, it is necessary to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the program. However, if program
coverage is very high, it will be necessary to introduce elements of general equilibrium to measure the
return of the instrument.20
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Table 1: Relative Productivity Gap of a great firm in relation
to a  SME (%).
1992 1993 1994
Productivity 44 47 42
Wages 51 53 52
Source: ENIA.23



















The definition of roles and responsibilities  for the
various positions of the organization?

































Safety in the production?
Environmental conditions?
External standardization  of quality process?









































Related to innovation of products, has the firm
introduced…
New Products?
Improvement s in products?















Evaluation of training needs?
New incentive procedures for employees?
Reduction of rotating?























Related to the external relationships of the business,
has the firm improved…24
The ability to negotiate with the clients?
The ability to negotiate with suppliers?
The capability to get new suppliers?
Enlarged national coverage?
Enlarged international coverage?
Business contacts with other managers of Profo?
Business contacts with other managers outside of
Profo?
Participation in sector associations of producers?




























Has there been innovation in the external

































Regarding the external relationships related with
Financial aspects has there been innovation in…
Capacity for formulating investment projects?
Access to private banking credit ?










Table 3: Distribution of the participant and control firms by productive sector (number of firms,
percentage between the groups and percentage between sectors).












































































































































Table 4: Average Added Value of Participating and Control Firms
(in thousands of $Chilean of 1992).
Group Obs Mean Standard
Error t-student
Control 149 333148,7 80509,0
Treated 102 112130,6 21368,1
Difference 221018,1 95513,4 2,314
Probability 0,0257
Table 5: Average Employees of Participating and Control Firms
(by number of workers in 1992).
Group Obs Mean Standard
Error t-student
Control 149 39,23 2,40
Treated 102 24,91 3,03
Difference 14,32 1,93 3,7406
Probability 0,0002
Table 6: Average Probability of Participating by Group (1992).
Group Obs Media Standard
Error t-student
Control 149 0,2796 0,0187
Treated 102 0,5947 0,0232
Difference -0,3150 0,0297 -10,5974
Probability 0,0000
Table 7: Average Growth in TFP.
Statistics Before-After
Estimator Difference in Difference Estimator
Mean 0,2295 0,1177
Standard Error 0,0512 0,0600
t-student 4,4830 1,9610
Probability 0,0000 0,051027








Mean 0,2295 0,1177 0,1442
Standard Error. 0,0512 0,0600 0,0650
t-student 4,483 1,961 2,217
Probability 0,000 0,051 0,028
Observations 102 252 174


















Mean 0,2295 0,1177 0,1490 0,1318 0,1246
Standard Error. 0,0512 0,0600 0,0722 0,0678 0,0650
t-student 4,483 1,961 1,936 1,993 1,994
Probability 0,000 0,051 0,055 0,048 0,048
Observations 102 252 171 171 171
Table 10: Cost-Benefit Balance (US$ of 1995).
Rubro de Costos U$S
Resources from Corfo 1.562.590
Resources from Firms 1.022.013
Other Resources 117.542
Total Costs 2.937.215














Graph 2: Propensity Scores of Participating in the PROFO Program.
Beneficiary Companies and Control with Common Support.
Pr(profo)
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